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v. JIMCO Ltd.. 618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980) (quoting 4 Corbin on Contracts § 
774 at 6 (I960)). In Utah, the determination of a third-party beneficiary is made 
"[wjhere it appears from the promise or the contracting situation that the parties 
intended that a third party receive a benefit . . . ." Hansen v. Green River Group. 
748 P.2d 1102,1105 (Utah Ct App. 1988) (quoting 2 S. Williston, A Treatise on 
the Law of Contracts § 356 (1981)). If a third party is an intended beneficiary of a 
contract, that party has an enforceable right against the promisor, see e.g.. Palmer 
v. Davis. 808 P.2d 128, 131 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), and not against the promisee, 
Pegasus Satellite TV. Inc. v. DirecTV. Inc.. 318 F. Supp. 2d 968,982 (D. Cal. 
2004) (additional citations omitted). 
Burgess misses the point by arguing that "[i]t is simply irrelevant to this 
case whether Burgess is then obligated under some other agreement to split the 
commission with a third party." (Appellee's Brief at 5.) As fully set forth in the 
Brief of Appellant Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. ("Appellant's Brief) and 
as further addressed below, the cover sheet was not "some other agreement." 
Instead, it was clearly part of the Riverside/Burgess transaction. Burgess's 
message on the cover sheet stated: "Dear Greg, Please review, execute A.S.A.P. 
and I will bring in the offer. I agree to split total [sic] fee indicated herein 50:50 
with [Realty] West." (R. at 209, 322, p. 5, In. 23-25; p. 6, In. 1) (emphasis added). 
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It is undisputed that "herein" referred to the document entitled Limited Listing 
Agreement. It is further undisputed that Hales was executing the Limited Listing 
Agreement on behalf of Riverside and not on behalf of Realty West. As a result, 
Riverside became the promisor contemplated above, obligated to pay half of any 
commission to Burgess and the other half to Realty West. As a third-party 
beneficiary, Realty West would have no claim against the promisee, Burgess. 
In other words, Riverside had no obligation to pay a full commission to 
Riverside in the hope that Riverside would then forward half of the commission to 
Realty West. Such an interpretation borders on the absurd. Instead, the parties 
intended for a third party (Realty West) to receive a separate and distinct benefit, 
i.e., half of the total commission noted in the Limited Listing Agreement. Only if 
the Limited Listing Agreement and the cover sheet agreement had been negotiated 
and executed separately would Burgess's argument possess any potential viability 
at all. However, the record is clear that the Limited Listing Agreement and the 
facsimile cover sheet were inextricably intertwined. At a bare minimum and 
against a standard requiring the facts to be construed in favor of Riverside, 
genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the documents comprised two 
separate agreements or one integrated agreement, thus precluding entry of 
summary judgment. Therefore, the cover sheet is relevant and the trial court erred 
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by dismissing it out of hand without any apparent consideration whatsoever. 
2. The Facsimile Cover Sheet is Not Parol Evidence and the 
Trial Court Erred by Designating it as Such Without a 
Preliminary Consideration of What Constituted the Parties' 
Integrated Agreement. 
It is well-settled under Utah law that before applying the parol evidence 
rule, a "court must first determine whether [a] writing was intended by the parties 
to be an integration. In resolving this preliminary question of fact, parol evidence, 
indeed any relevant evidence, is admissible." Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 
663, 665 (Utah 1985): see also Hall v. Process Instruments and Control. Inc.. 866 
P.2d 604, 606 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, § 209(2) (1981) ["whether there is an integrated agreement is to be 
determined by the court as a question preliminary to determination of a question of 
interpretation or to application of the parol evidence rule"]). 
The seminal case in Utah on the subject is Union Bank, a case analyzed in 
Appellant's Brief. In Union Bank, the trial court applied the parol evidence rule to 
a promissory note which, on its face, appeared to be an integrated unambiguous 
agreement by Ronald and Margie Swenson to "individually and personally" repay 
a bank loan. 707 P.2d at 664. The Utah Supreme Court, applying the two-step 
analysis noted above, reversed the trial court's decision. Id at 669. Specifically, 
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the court reasoned that 
the record does not include a specific factual determination that the note 
was, or was not, an integration. The trial court apparently assumed from 
the face of the note that it was an integration and apparently applied the 
parol evidence rule without making the [required] threshold factual 
determination . . . . Such an omission would be inconsequential . . . 
unless appellants raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
the writing was in fact an integrated. However, appellants' pleadings 
and affidavits in opposition to summary judgment do raise a genuine 
issue of material fact requiring a specific determination as to whether the 
note was integrated. 
Id. at 665-66. The court clarified the policy behind the analysis, noting that 
"[protection against judicial enforcement of writings that appear to be binding 
integrations but in fact are not lies in the provision that all relevant evidence is 
admissible on the threshold issue of whether the writing was adopted by the 
parties as an integration of their agreement." Id, at 665. 
Several months after Union Bank was decided, the Utah Supreme Court 
applied the same analysis in Colonial Leasing Company of New England, Inc. v. 
Larsen Brothers Construction. Co.. 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). In Colonial 
Leasing, the trial court, applying the parol evidence rule, granted summary 
judgment in favor of Colonial Leasing Company based on a document which, on 
its face was clearly a "lease" which contained an integration clause and expressly 
required the return of a crawler-loader at the end of a 60-month period. Id. at 485. 
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Citing Union Bank, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that "the trial court must 
first determine whether the writing was intended to be an integrated agreement." 
Id. at 486 (additional citations omitted). In reversing the trial court's ruling, the 
Utah Supreme Court reasoned that "the trial judge did not expressly rule whether 
the purported lease was an integrated writing. Since the affidavits raise a factual 
issue as to whether the contract was in fact integrated, the trial judge will need to 
hear evidence on that issue." Id at 487. 
The current case mirrors both Union Bank and Colonial Leasing. In the 
face of pleadings and the Affidavit of Gregory Hales asserting that the Limited 
Listed Agreement was not an integration, the trial court made no determination of 
the effect of the facsimile cover sheet and whether the Limited Listing Agreement 
without the facsimile cover sheet constituted an integration of the parties' actual 
agreement. Instead, the court ignored the issue and the required analysis 
altogether, stating, "[I]t's a straight forward matter. We have one contract [i.e., the 
Limited Listing Agreement] and then we've got a bunch of parole [sic] evidence. 
Plaintiffs motion is granted as prayed." (R. at 322, p. 11, In. 3-6.) 
Burgess makes no substantive argument against Riverside's contention that 
"the trial court failed to make any determination whether the LLA was intended to 
be an integration independent of the cover sheet " (Appellant's Brief at 13.) 
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Instead, Burgess resorts to challenging two of Riverside's cursory citations to 
Utah cases, and selectively challenges one of the cases used by Riverside to 
support the proposition that a cover letter has regularly been considered by other 
jurisdictions as part of an integrated agreement. (See Appellee's Brief at 6-8.) 
Appellant's Brief cites to Web-Bank v. American General Annuity Services 
Corp.. 2002 UT 88, 54 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2002) and Ward v. Intermountain Farmers 
Ass'n.. 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995) merely to support the general proposition that 
the intention of the parties is the ultimate critical inquiry in any contract case. 
(See Appellant's Brief at 11-12.) While it is true that both of these cases focused 
on ambiguity as opposed to integration, the proposition for which they were cited 
applies equally to both inquiries, i.e., the determination of whether a contract is 
integrated is rooted in the overriding policy of determining the actual intent of the 
parties. In any event, Appellant's Brief relies principally on Union Bank, which, 
as noted above, clearly addresses the threshold integration question. 
Moreover, inasmuch as no Utah case has addressed the specific factual issue 
of a cover letter as part of an integrated agreement, Riverside has provided 
authority for this proposition from other jurisdictions. (See Appellant's Brief at 
12-13.) Burgess challenges only one of these cases, Steinke v. Sungard Financial 
Systems. 121 F.3d 763 (1st Cir. 1997), and does so misguidedly. (See Appellee's 
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Brief at 7-8.) In Steinke. a terminated employee, James A. Steinke ("Steinke"), 
sued his former employer, claiming that he had been promised a three-year term of 
employment. 121 F.3d at 766-68. Specifically, Steinke claimed that despite a 
cover letter containing salary terms and an employment agreement form 
containing an at will termination provision, id at 767, his employer had orally 
fixed a three-year employment term, id at 770. 
Without any discussion, analysis, or argument, Burgess simply quotes 
language from Steinke stating, in pertinent part, that "[i]f the alleged oral and 
written agreement relate to the same subject matter and are so interrelated that 
both would be executed at the same time and in the same contract, the scope of the 
subsidiary agreement must be taken to be covered bv the writing." (Appellee's 
Brief at 7-8) (emphasis added by Burgess) (quoting Steinke, 121 F.3d at 770). 
The fact pattern and analysis in Steinke support Riverside's argument in the 
current case. In fact, the First Circuit in Steinke employed the same analysis 
utilized by Utah courts - "'Whether a writing is an integrated agreement, and if so, 
whether the agreement is completely or partially integrated are questions to be 
decided by the court prior to application of the parol evidence rule.'" Steinke. 121 
F.3d at 770 (additional citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
As in Steinke. this case involves a cover letter sent with a form agreement. 
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The Steinke Court upheld the trial court's finding that the cover letter with the 
employment agreement constituted the parties' integrated agreement. Id at 769. 
In this case, the trial court did not even consider whether Burgess's cover letter 
was part of the parties' integrated agreement. Furthermore, contrary to the facts in 
Steinke. Riverside makes no allegation of an oral agreement apart from the cover 
letter and Limited Listing Agreement. And, unlike Steinke. where the alleged oral 
agreement directly conflicted with a term in the employment agreement, the term 
at issue in this case is not in a similar state of conflict. Instead, Burgess's cover 
letter makes perfect sense in light of the facts in the record. Burgess's standard 
Limited Listing Agreement calling for a 4% commission was not agreeable to 
Riverside where Hales was a licensed real estate broker himself. (R. at 322, p. 9, 
In. 5-7.) Burgess therefore agreed that Riverside would pay half of the 
commission to Burgess and half to Realty West. 
In sum, Burgess has provided no substantive opposition to the well-
established proposition that the trial court was required - and failed - to consider 
all relevant evidence to determine the terms of the parties' integrated agreement. 
Neither has Burgess countered or even substantively addressed the fact that a 
cover letter can be a part of an integrated agreement. Accordingly, this Court 
should reverse the trial court's ruling and require the trial court to consider the 
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facsimile cover letter as part of the parties' integrated agreement. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER 
BURGESS'S FEBRUARY 27, 2002 LETTER, APPARENTLY 
CONSIDERING IT TO BE PAROL EVIDENCE EXEMPT FROM 
CONSIDERATION. 
1. The February 27 Letter is Relevant. 
As fully set forth above, the fact that Riverside was obligated to Realty 
West as a third-party beneficiary does not render the facsimile cover sheet 
irrelevant to an inquiry regarding the parties' integrated agreement. (See supra at 
2-4.) For the same reasons, Burgess's February 27,2002 letter is also relevant. 
As also set forth above, in making the preliminary determination of whether an 
agreement is integrated, "parol evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is 
admissible." Union Bank. 707 P.2d at 664 (additional citations omitted). 
The February 27 letter unequivocally demonstrates that Burgess expected, at 
best, only a 2% commission, i.e., a split of the commission noted in the Limited 
Listing Agreement. This relevant evidence would have been of great assistance to 
the trial court in determining the nature of the parties' integrated agreement had it 
properly evaluated the letter without dismissing it out of hand as parol evidence. 
2. The February 27 Letter is Admissible and Not Barred by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
Burgess misses the point of the February 27 letter when it asserts that the 
12 
"letter is inadmissible as evidence of a modification to the Limited Listing 
Agreement under the Statute of Frauds and is obviously not enforceable as an 
independent agreement to modify the Limited Listed Agreement because it is not 
even between Burgess and Riverside." (Appellee's Brief at 10.) Riverside has 
never argued that the letter constitutes a modification. Rather, it is evidence of the 
parties' original agreement. Accordingly, the Statute of Frauds in no way bars 
consideration of the February 27 letter. Even if the Statute of Frauds was 
applicable, "statutes of fraud do not prevent a party from proving the true nature of 
the agreement between the parties when that is what is at issue rather than 
enforceability." Colonial Leasing. 731 P.2d at 486. The issue in this case is 
exactly that - the true nature of the parties5 agreement. Therefore, Burgess's 
opposition based on the Statute of Frauds fails. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT NO GENUINE 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AS TO RIVERSIDE'S CLAIM 
FOR FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT. 
1. Riverside's Fraud Claim is Not Defeated by the Doctrines of 
Waiver, Estoppel, and/or Ratification. 
Burgess argues that by selling the Riverside Mobile Home Park (the "Park") 
to Affordable Residential Communities ("ARC") for $4.6 million, Riverside 
continued to perform or otherwise ratify the Limited Listing Agreement and 
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therefore, even if there was fraud, Riverside is precluded from arguing the effects 
of fraud in the inducement because it continued to act after having knowledge of 
the alleged fraud. (See Appellee's Brief at 12.) On the contrary, the facts in the 
record, which must be viewed in a light most favorable to Riverside, demonstrate 
that Riverside only continued to act because Burgess agreed to reduce its 
commission from 2% to 1%. (R. at 206.) In other words, Riverside's "knowledge 
of the facts" was that first Burgess would be paid a 2% commission and then, 
when the price was reduced dramatically upon ARC's discovery of Burgess's 
misrepresentations, Riverside's "knowledge" was that Burgess would be paid a 
1% commission. (R. at 206.) Riverside never continued to act in contemplation of 
the terms of the Limited Listing Agreement with the knowledge that Burgess 
asserts, i.e., under a scenario where Burgess would be paid a 4% or even a 2% 
commission. Therefore, Burgess's argument for waiver fails. 
Additionally, the anticipated benefit bargained for by Riverside in the 
commission agreement was to sell the Park for $5.5 million and to pay a 2% 
commission to Burgess. Riverside did not receive the benefit of this bargain. 
Instead, it sold the Park for $4.6 million and Burgess now seeks 4% of that sales 
price, a proposition never agreed to by the parties. Thus, under no stretch of the 
imagination has Riverside received or accepted the benefit of its anticipated 
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bargain. Finally, for the same reasons that Riverside has not waived its fraud 
claim, it also has not ratified the Limited Listing Agreement. 
2. At a Minimum, the Trial Court Failed to View the Allegations 
of Fraud in a Light Most Favorable to Riverside and to 
Evaluate Them at Ail-
Tellingly, Burgess fails even to address the analysis in Union Bank set forth 
in Appellant's Brief. Instead, in a solitary paragraph, Burgess simply rehashes its 
ongoing reliance on the "clear and unambiguous language of the Limited Listing 
Agreement." (Appellee's Brief at 14.) However, as amply established by Union 
Bank and ignored by Burgess, 
[w]hat appears to be a complete and binding integrated agreement may 
be a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an agreement without consideration, or 
it may be voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or the like, or it may be 
illegal. Such invalidating causes need not and commonly do not appear 
on the face of the writing. 
707 P.2d at 665 (additional citation omitted). 
Contrary to Burgess's assertions, abundant evidence exists regarding 
Burgess's fraud in the inducement. At a minimum, the Affidavit of D. Gregory 
Hales creates genuine issues of material fact relating to the issue. As fully set 
forth in Riverside's principal brief, Burgess represented to Hales that it had a 
buyer ready, willing and able to pay $5.5 million to purchase the Park. (R. at 205.) 
Based on this representation, Riverside was induced to sign the Limited Listing 
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Agreement. (R. at 205.) The facsimile cover sheet, which accompanied the 
unsigned Limited Listing Agreement, instructed Hales to "review, execute 
A.S.A.P. and I will bring in the offer," (R. at 209) (emphasis added), supporting 
Riverside's assertion that it relied on Burgess's representation and that but for this 
representation, Riverside never would have signed the Limited Listing Agreement, 
(R. at 205). Additionally, the trial court ignored evidence that Hales, as a licensed 
real estate broker, had no need for another broker to list the Park unless the broker 
already had a buyer ready to pay an acceptable price. (R. at 322, p. 9, In. 5-7.) 
At a minimum, then, questions of material fact existed in connection with 
Riverside's claim that Burgess fraudulently induced it to enter the Limited Listing 
Agreement. Therefore, the trial court erred by failing to consider extrinsic 
evidence in ruling in favor of Burgess. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Riverside respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's decision and remand the proceedings to the trial court for 
the finder of fact to resolve issues of fact at trial. 
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